Consolidated Space Test Center Capability to Support Small Satellites by Smith, Lt Col David
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
CONSOLIDATED SPACE TEST CENTER 
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ABSTRACT 
No analysis of small satellite programs is complete 
without thorough considerat1on of the operational 
concept that wi 11 support them. It is not uncommon 
today that a space system1s lifecycle cost will show 
that operating costs exceeded development and 
production costs. This is part1cularly true for 
programs that hope to reduce spacecraft expense by 
transferring, to the ground, as much of the on-board 
processing requirements as operat1onally feasible. 
Facl1ity, hardware. software, maintenance, manning, 
training, communications, on-orbit operat1ons and 
launch costs all factor into the total operations 
spending and must be prudently considered. 
The Consolidated Space Test Center (STC) located in 
Sunnyvale, California addresses these factors with an 
important strength - experience. Over 25 years of 
satellite operations history has prepared the STC for 
the tremendous cha 11 enge of economi ca lly operat; ng 
"one-of-a-kind" spacecraft prototypes or a large 
constellat1on of spacecraft for a user community 
increasingly constrained by limited funding. The STC 
will meet this challenge through flexibility and 
adaptation. Today, STC operated spacecraft are 
supported through UHF. VHF, L-Band, and Unified 
S-Band links. A world-wide network of permanent 
ground stations is being continually upgraded and 
supplemented by transportable assets capable of 
remotely located operations. In addition to these 
telemetry, tracking and commanding systems, the STC 
is driving to develop a mission data reduction and 
processing capability. These cost efficient systems 
form the vanguard to an STC ability aimed at meeting 
user requirements at all levels of resource 
commitment and effort. 
INTRODUCTI ON 
One of the most important issues confronUng the Small Satellite 
program community is the question "How will the Small Satellite 
mission be accomplished on-orbit?". No aspect of the Small 
Satellite's conceptual development stands independent from this 
fundamental operaUonal decision. A hypotheUcal Small Satellite's 
orbit ;s significantly influenced by the operational decision as to 
how and where a user will access spacecraft telemetry. Complexity of 
the satellite's onboard software is completely tied to a tradeoff with 
how much software and gener i c suppor t capabl1 ity wi 11 be prov i ded 
ground operators. Even the' simple operaUonal determinaUon of the 
satellite's desired lifetime waterfalls into reliability, spacecraft 
size, hardware, software, orbit and other developmental compartments. 
Despite the clear relaUonship between operaUons and satell ite 
design, there are a surprising number of instances where a spacecraft 
system was constructed with little attention paid to operaUonal 
issues. Spacecraft are designed incompatible with existing satellite 
networks necessitating costly network or spacecraft modifications late 
in the development timelines. On-orbit support costs exceed program 
budgets over time as satellite'S past their mission usefulness are 
supported only because they are still operating. 
One of the Small Satellite program's most important challenges will be 
to recognize the intrinsic value of answering operational questions in 
detail and subsequently incorporating those answers into their system 
designs early. This paper is intended to address specific operational 
area candidates for this early incorporaUon and to apprise the 
community of an organization committed to supporting Small Satellite 
development with operational expertise unmatched anywhere in the world 
-- the Consolidated Space Test Center. 
THE CONSOLIDATED SPACE TEST CENTER 
For over 25 years the Consolidated Space Test Center (CSTC) has 
operated numerous national space programs with scientific, civilian, 
and military objectives. Recently. the CSTC has even supported the 
satellites of foreign nations -- a testament to the Center's widely 
recognized expertise. What began as a distinct research and 
development effort now includes operations that routinely provide 
on-orbit support to space assets implicitly relied on by operating 
commands of the armed forces. In fact, as space systems and 
spacecraft achieved reliability and standardhaUon, spending on 
research and development efforts declined in favor of mission systems. 
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Today, in an era of dynamic and demanding future spacecraft 
requirements, the relative importance of strong research and 
development programs is tremendously increasing. This reemphasis was 
an important contributor to the formation of the Unified Space Command 
and the division of rouUne mission operations and research and 
development operaUons between two principle space centers. The 
recently commissioned Consolidated Space Operations Center in Colorado 
Springs will operate established and routine support satellHe 
constellations wHh communication, navigaUon and weather missions. 
The CSTC, located in Sunnyvale, California will serve as a redundant 
node for these operations but more importantly, as an asset of the Air 
Force System Command's Space Division, will become the focus of all 
military sponsored space research and development operations and 
orbital safety initiatives. The CSTC is executing a concerted program 
to enhance its resources supporting this specific charter. 
Both Centers make use of the Air Force Satellite Control Network, a 
globally dispersed array of tracking stations. Spacecraft are 
commanded from these stations, telemetry is retrieved, and the 
tracking data they produce is used for ephemeriS determination and 
prediction. This support is provided for satellites and the NASA STS 
Orbiter flights and represents numerous programs. Scheduling of these 
resources and resolution of schedule conflicts for R&D programs is a 
service provided by the CSTC. AddHional Network assets are the 
r ad i ome t ric can bra t i on fa c 11 H Y a t C amp Par k s, C a l1f or n i a, and t he 
Timing System at Sunnyvale for universal range timing data. 
SMALL SATELLITES AND THE SPACE TEST CENTER 
The Space Test Center is well equipped for support of space R&D, and 
will become increaSingly so as the planned improvements are 
implemented. The Center's greatest assets are its experienced crews 
of controllers and analysts, who have supported space missions 
launched on expendable rockets, deployed by the Orbiter, or flown as 
sortie missions on the Orbiter. They have supported multiple 
deployments and tests of ballistic systems. These crews, along with 
program office operations people and contractor support, operate out 
of secure Mission Control Centers at Sunnyvale. The Consolidated 
Space Operations Center's coming on line will allow dedicaUon of 
Mission Control Center resources at Sunnyvale to R&D support. These 
Mission Control Centers will continue to have full access to the 
Satellite Control Network and its scheduling operation. In addition. 
they provide access to NASA resources, such as the Tracking and Data 
Relay SatellHe System, by the resident programs. Communication 
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networks l1nk the Control Centers to A1r Force and NASA centers and to 
other test faciliUes, for both voice and data transm1ss10n. Each 
center is be1ng equipped with dedicated process1ng equipment for 
mission support. These processors host the upgraded Command and 
Control Segment software wh1ch covers all generic aspects of normal 
operation. 
To the operators in these Control Centers, the size of the satellite 
is, in 1tself, of no consequence. Standardized operational procedures 
are directly applicable to space vehicles of any size. The mission of 
the satellite dictates the nature of 1ts operation. This bears on an 
1mportant subpoint of th1s paper: the influence of operations on the 
life-cycle costs of a space program. The concept of deploying small 
satell ites as a cost-saving measure must account for all cost 
elements. It is not unusual for the operating costs of on-orbit 
spacecraft to equal or exceed the initial development costs. At 
present, the Air Force and NASA are, by necessity, focusing on launch 
capability, and program planners commonly use the cost per pound to 
orbit as a preliminary yardstick of program cost. Reduction of this 
cost element has been the subject of intensive study by both agencies; 
and of course, reducUon of payload weight is as legitimate an 
approach as is reduction of the price per pound for lHting the 
payload. Estimates of life-cycle costs are, however, a basic tenet of 
the system engineering which produces space systems. Major cost 
elements in operations must be identHied, and the program shaped 
wherever possible to keep these costs at affordable levels. 
PRE-LAUNCH AND SPACE FLIGHT ACTIVITIES 
To develop a clear understanding of the costs of operating a space 
vehicle, it is appropriate to step through the various activities 
which the program office and the Space Test Center undertake leading 
up to the operation, and those which comprise the flight itself after 
deployment. These activities are typical for a small satellite tasked 
with gathering scientific data, but apply at least in part to many 
other mission profiles as well. {It should be noted, however, that 
they do not apply to deployments of large numbers of vehicles over a 
short period of time. Consolidated Space Test Center studies of SOl 
and other large-scale deployment control requirements shows that a 
major network upgrade is needed for these cases.} The activities are 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2. The following text follows the sequence 
of these figures. 
Once a program concept has been formed, early mission planning is 
essential, for orderly cataloging of the vehicle design and support 
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requirements, and for estimating program costs. This planning is 
embodied in an Operations Concept. The operational community can 
provide consultaUve services at this stage which can lead to 
substantial cost savings, although some design and mission tradeoffs 
may be indicated. The Operations Concept ;s a living document which 
develops along with the program. 
Mission simulaUons should be performed early, particularly if the 
data-taking process is strongly influenced by orbit parameters and 
launch time. The Space Test Center can assist in this, and make 
preliminary runs to aid in the orbit selection and to assure that the 
likelihood of collision with 'other spacecraft or with orbiting debris 
is insignificant. 
Mission Control Center activation takes place well in advance of the 
launch date, so that fl ight software and procedures can be well 
polished and the necessary crew training accomplished. The latter 
usually involves familiarizing Air Force and Mission Control Center 
personnel with the mission and vehicle, and program crew members with 
Consolidated Space Test Center and network operations. 
Software preparation entails the development and test of mission 
unique software, its interface with the Mission Control Center common 
user software, data base preparation, and formulation of operating 
procedures for its use. A resource use plan is generated, as is a 
search plan for initial acquisition of a vehicle deployed by an 
expendable. 
Rehearsals are essenUal for all missions. They are held in a 
realistic environment, involve the network and the Control Center, and 
demonstrate flight readiness in all respects. 
Prior to launch, communicaUons checks are made between the mission 
vehicle and the network, to assure compatibility once the vehicle is 
in orbit. In some instances, these checks may first be conducted 
while the vehicle is still at the factory. 
Pre-launch acUviUes and the launch itself are monitored in the 
Mission Control Center, and vehicle and payload data taken during this 
phase are processed and analyzed in the Center. An updated collision 
avoidance run is made as a step in pre-launch processing. 
Tests are conducted on the vehicle systems and payloads once orbit is 
attained. The length of time allotted to such tests varies from a few 
revolutions to weeks, depending on the mission1s nature and on the 
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program office1s particular needs and intents. Following these 
checkouts, normal operations begin. 
Drawing on mission-length pre-planning, an activity plan is composed 
daily, spelling out the specHic resources -- tracking stations or 
relay satellite contacts -- needed each day. Command messages are 
composed and transmitted to the vehicle during contacts. Telemetry 
data is retrieved, processed, and analyzed. Tracking data is reduced. 
ephemerides determined and predicted. and advance planning 
undertaken. These are routine efforts but most programs have special 
activities as well. startracker acquisition routines for example. 
Assessment of vehicle health and management of its expendables also 
are part of the daily routine. Many spacecraft require stationkeeping 
or orbit adjustment. to overcome the effects of perturbations and so 
maintain an acceptable orbit. Planning these and executing them are 
Mission Control Center tasks. 
Spacecraft renab11ity has increased greatly since early years of 
space flight. Occasionally. however. anomalous behavior develops. In 
some ins tances, it can be innocuous, but in others it can threaten 
termination of the mission. The Mission Control Center must be 
postured to deal promptly and effectively with these situations, and 
as will be seen, this can be a major element in operating costs. 
Several space vehicles have achieved truly astonishing life periods. 
returning useful data after many years. Most, however, eventually run 
out of some expendable, or simply outlive their usefulness. They can 
at this point be shut down. The CSTC has conducted planning exercises 
for retrieving vehicles with the Orbiter, and this appears to have 
some potential advantages. Increasing concern within the community 
over the amount of debris in space has led to consideration of 
deboosting spent satellites into the ocean in untrafficed areas; the 
Space Test Center plans to have the software resources to plan and 
execute such deboosts safely. It is conceivable that retrieval or 
deboost may be mandatory at some time in the future. 
OPERATION COSTS 
Space operations costs are divisible into non-recurrent and recurrent 
costs. The major non-recurrent costs lie in implementation of new 
operational capabilities, which include hardware modifications and new 
software generation. Recurrent costs are principally those involved 
in program manning, software maintenance and hardware maintenance. 
The CSTC is not industrially funded; users flying spacecraft on the 
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range are not charged by the number of contacts per day. The CSTC has 
a budget for sustaining operational efforts and improvements in common 
user equipment and software. Given adequate lead time, the CSTC will 
budget such items as new communications links, if they are backed by 
validated requirements. 
Program planners can eliminate excessive non-recurrent costs by 
talloring their missions to be compaUble wHh exisUng network 
capabilHies. This use of standardized communication, tracking, 
command, and telemetry systems often leads to an increase in actual 
spacecraft costs. However, what is lost to more expensive spacecraft 
hardware, is gained back in operations savings. For example, a 
program may have access to a non-standard command system which is 
inexpensive and readily available, but the cost of network hardware 
and software modifications to accommodate it can run many times the 
system procurement savings. By selecting a higher performance command 
system compaUble wHh an exisUng network, hardware and software 
savings may outweigh the cost of the new command system. Consolidated 
Space Test Center personnel are available to consult wHh mission 
planners, and to infuse the Center's experience into the program 
concept at the outset. 
CSTC space operations are run by computers. The common user software, 
hosted on IBM 310 Series processors, supports routine and special 
operations. InevHably, however. all programs require some unique 
software suite. The sharp program manager will avoid costly 
duplication of existing routines by determining what existing software 
;s available and compatible wHh his mission profile. Standard 
routines exist. for example. for ephemeris generation and for maneuver 
and orbit adjust planning. A star catalog is resident in the 
software. as are geopotential and geomagnetic models; and rendezvous 
software is planned. Unnecessary costs can be incurred in building up 
mission-related software, for use in development as well as in flight 
operations. 1f it is not compatible with Center software and 
processing equipment. Again. at a very early stage in a program. 
planners are advised to consult with the CSTC on the matter of mission 
unique software. and to avail themselves to existing routines and to 
the CSTC's experience in helping formulate specialized software 
packages. 
The size of the Mission Control Center team depends on many factors. 
The team is composed of Air Force Mission Directors. CSTC Mission 
Controllers. and program-sponsored analysts for vehicle and payload 
support. Support requirements -- the number of contacts per day. the 
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amount of vehicle analysis deemed necessary. and the nature of payload 
activity - determine the number of crew members. A major factor in 
crew sizing lies in the satellite's reliability. The crew will have 
to contend with anomalies and if these are frequent and serious. work 
loads will increase. Increased workload translates to increased 
manning. Often. design specialists from the vehicle or payload 
contractor's facility are called into the Mission Control Center to 
aid in the process. Obviously. this is costly in itself; and during 
periods when anomalies are being resolved. the mission may be 
suspended. which raises the IIprice per bit" of mission data. 
Reliability shortcuts can be costly; inherent design features and 
adequate testing are sound investments. although they may appear to be 
tempting areas for economizing measures. 
Standardization also plays into crew costs relative to training. If 
the Mission Control Team and analysts are familiar with the vehicle 
systems. retraining is confined to payload familiarization affecting 
software and procedures generation costs as well. This suggests that 
the Small Satellite Program, as an entity, could profit by considering 
a standardized spacecraft bus (or more than one). The economies in 
subsystem manufacture, and in vehicle testing, as well as in 
operation. could well be worth the difficulties which always accompany 
a standardization campaign. On a program-wide basis, the possibility 
of sharing Mission Control Centers and, to some extent, their crews, 
should also be investigated. Most of the Mission Control Centers 
today handle a number of spacecraft. 
Developing and building a satellite of any size will always be an 
expensive proposiUon. by any standards. While many satellites may 
continue providing useful data for years. as alluded to earlier, most 
have to amor ti ze the i nves tment over a s pan of months. The 
possibility of alleviating this by retrieving a spent spacecraft is 
not a new thought: witness the WESTAR and PALAPA operaUon. The 
empty Orbiter payload bays on their return to Earth deserve 
attention. The difficulties are not to be minimized, but studies 
suggest an attractive offset in refurbishment versus build costs. 
From an overall Small Satellite Program point of view, envisioning an 
on-going series of missions over several years, reusable standardized 
spacecraft buses hold promise of significant economies. Whether these 
should be credited to operations might be subject to debate. In any 
event. the Consol idated Space Test Center planners are making 
retrieval a subject of study. 
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Other new developments may also reduce operational costs. The CSTC 
has a set of Expert Systems planned, which will be tested off-line in 
the operational environment. These, it is hoped, wnl reduce the 
manpower intensity associated with many routine tasks, and make the 
process of anomaly resolution more efficient. There is also a program 
at the Center for incorporating new technology into vehicle analyst 
workstations which should help keep crew sizes affordable. Both these 
developments require strong integration with the satellite design 
effort from its inception. 
Data rates, and data-taking spans, present another area of interplay 
between satellite design and operations considerations. Use of the 
network tracking stations for low earth orbit vehicles restrict the 
amount and rate of data which can be recovered at any contact, and 
probably wnl require tape recorders on the satellite. Relay 
satell ites such as the NASA TDRSS handle much higher rates, and 
provide long contact spans; but the mission satellite using this 
service requires high-grade stabilization and a pointing antenna of 
considerable she. Also, competition for TDRSS services may become 
keen in the future. CSTC planners are advocating an Air Force relay 
system at EHF, which could ameliorate these issues; but such a system 
is yet to be authorized. The CSTC is now studying the possibility of 
setting out inexpensive transportable ground stations, spaced so as to 
provide near-continuous coverage for spans of 30 to 40 minutes in 
10w-incl1nation orbits. Development programs are under way to 
increase the data rates which the network links can handle, and to 
prov; de a computer fac i 1 ity capable of proces s; ng very hi gh-ra te 
mission data. 
Lastly, a tradeoff must be addressed, particularly in Small 
Satell1tes, between vehicle autonomy and crew operations. A very 
simple vehicle may be an economy in manufacture and test, but may 
result in operations costs which exceed the savings. Clearly, 
autonomy carried past some point can offset any possible good. If the 
vehicle hardware reliability is actually reduced by a collection of 
fault sensors and the like, this may be negative progress. The 
behavior of autonomous systems on spacecraft can be a challenge to the 
operators l understanding as well, and this can lead to expensive 
delays in restoring mission operations after an anomaly. 
SUMMARY 
In summary. the cost elements in operations which should be considered 
by Small Satellite planners are the following: 
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a) 
b) 
design to existing operational capabilities to the greatest 
extent possible; use standardized subsystems wherever a 
choice exists; 
tailor the mission to avoid large, complex software 
developments for flight support; 
c) use available software routines and services where 
appropriate; 
d) 
e) 
f) 
design software which may be used in operations support for 
compatibility with the Space Test Center software environment; 
abstain from design and test shortcuts which could reduce 
vehicle operational reliability; 
provide a good balance between vehicle autonomy and 
ground-controlled vehicle operations. 
Consideration of the operational environment and consultation wHh 
Consolidated Space Test Center planners in the earliest phases of a 
program can lead to solid economies, and make for smooth operations 
from launch date on. 
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